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Abstract: What makes fast, cumulative cultural evolution work? Where did it come from? 
Why is it the sole preserve of humans? We set out a self-assembly hypothesis: cultural 
evolution evolved culturally. We present an evolutionary account that shows this hypothesis 
to be coherent, plausible, and worthy of further investigation. It has the following steps: (0) in 
common with other animals, early hominins had significant capacity for social learning; (1) 
knowledge and skills learned by offspring from their parents began to spread because bearers 
had more offspring, a process we call CS1 (or Cultural Selection 1); (2) CS1 shaped 
attentional learning biases; (3) these attentional biases were augmented by explicit learning 
biases (judgements about what should be copied from whom). Explicit learning biases 
enabled (4) the high-fidelity, exclusive copying required for fast cultural accumulation of 
knowledge and skills by a process we call CS2 (or Cultural Selection 2), and (5) the 
emergence of cognitive processes such as imitation, mindreading and metacognition – 
‘cognitive gadgets’ specialised for cultural learning.  This self-assembly hypothesis is 
consistent with archaeological evidence that the stone tools used by early hominins were not 
dependent on fast, cumulative cultural evolution, and suggests new priorities for research on 





How did human cultural evolution get off the ground? It would be an exaggeration to say 
there is nothing at all like it elsewhere in the natural world. Cetaceans[1-4], great apes[5, 6] 
and other animals[7-11] also pass skills down the generations through social learning, leading 
to stable differences between sub-populations. These differences are often called 
“traditions.”[2, 10] Young bottlenose dolphins learn foraging techniques from their 
parents[12], young chimpanzees learn from older group members how to extract ants and 
termites from their mounds with sticks[13]. But human cultural evolution (see Table 1) is 
different. It is cumulative: small improvements to skills and technologies accumulate, 
resulting in products of such complexity that no one individual could possibly have designed 
them alone, without any learning from others[14-17]. Examples include canoes, spears, fire 
control, detoxification of bitter manioc, and, more recently, steam engines, computers, and 
satellites. Moreover, the accumulation is fast: improvements spread rapidly through 
populations, no longer tied to the timescale of biological generations. What makes fast, 
cumulative cultural evolution work? Where did it come from? And why is it the sole preserve 
of humans? 
There is an emerging consensus that fast cultural accumulation draws on a suite of 
cognitive mechanisms including selective social learning, imitation, language, mindreading 
(or theory-of-mind) for teaching, metacognition and normative cognition, and that humans 
have evolved uniquely sophisticated versions of these mechanisms[18, 19]. But what explains 
the origin of these mechanisms?  
A popular, influential type of answer appeals to gene-culture co-evolution. This occurs 
when the genetic composition of a population responds to changes in the cultural 
environment, leading to yet further changes in the cultural environment, and so on. The idea 
is often illustrated by the case of lactose tolerance: genes for lactose tolerance followed the 
spread of dairy farming, and enabled yet more dairy farming. Boyd and Richerson [20] 
proposed that some of the cognitive mechanisms involved in human cultural evolution— 
including the mechanisms mediating conformist bias—evolved, like lactose tolerance, by 
gene-culture co-evolution. This has remained a central tenet of the “California school” of 
cultural evolution that Boyd, Richerson, Henrich and their collaborators have built over the 
past thirty years. 
While gene-culture co-evolution has received a great deal of attention, much less has 
been given to its purely cultural counterpart. We call this (borrowing a term from 
Muthukrishna and Henrich [21]) culture-culture co-evolution. As we define it here, culture-
culture co-evolution occurs when a culturally inherited cognitive mechanism evolves in 
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response to a cultural environment, altering that environment and enabling further evolution 
of the cognitive mechanism, without any underlying genetic change.  
Our aim here is to explain the basic idea of culture-culture co-evolution and to argue 
that it is worthy of sustained empirical investigation. Indeed, when it comes to explaining the 
origins of cumulative culture, we think it may even provide a better explanation than gene-
culture co-evolution. 
 
Cultural selection, fast and slow 
At the core of our hypothesis about the origins of cumulative culture is a distinction between 
two types of cultural selection. A Darwinian process is one that relies on blind variation and 
selective retention (Supplement 1). In genetic evolution, “selective retention” always 
involves the differential survival and/or reproduction of individuals. But in cultural evolution, 
there are two different types of “selective retention” operating at different timescales. 
The first, slower type is natural selection on culturally inherited variation [16, 22]. We 
will call this Cultural Selection 1 or CS1. CS1 is closely analogous to natural selection on 
genetic variation. When offspring spend a long time learning practical skills and ecological 
knowledge from their parents, valuable skills and knowledge will tend to spread through the 
population for the simple reason that their bearers will tend to have more offspring. Just as in 
a traditional process of natural selection, change is driven by differences in the number of 
biological offspring an organism produces. However, unlike in a traditional process of natural 
selection, the differences in reproductive output are caused by inherited differences in 
cultural variants, not genes, and they are transmitted from parents to offspring through social 
learning rather than genetic inheritance.  
The second, faster type of Darwinian process occurs when individuals compete with 
each other for learners, so that individuals who recruit more learners can be said to have 
higher cultural fitness [23]. We will call this Cultural Selection 2, or CS2. Roughly, an 
agent’s cultural fitness, with respect to a specific cultural trait, is the number of learners to 
whom it transmits its variant of that trait through social learning [22-25]. When learners are 
choosing from a wide range of potential models, and the models are competing for learners, 
there is potential for fast accumulation of small improvements, because the process need not 
be tied to the timescale of biological reproduction. We think CS2 lies at the heart of 
“cumulative culture” as we know it today. Small improvements to existing techniques spread 
not because they necessarily increase anyone’s reproductive success, but because they allow 
models to attract more learners. 
 5 
Although we have set out the CS1/CS2 at the individual level, the same distinction can 
be drawn at the group level. In other words, the CS1/CS2 distinction cross-cuts the 
distinction between individual selection and group selection. In the group-level version of 
CS1, change is driven by biological fitness differences between groups, and these differences 
are due to culturally inherited variation in group-wide patterns of behaviour. In the group-
level version of CS2, change is driven by cultural fitness differences between groups—
differences in their ability to attract new migrants who will learn their ways. This group-level 
version of CS2 will be important later on. 
The CS1/CS2 distinction allows us to pose our question like this: at some point in 
human evolution, CS1 began to be supplemented by CS2, allowing fast cultural 
accumulation. Was this transition driven by gene-culture co-evolution, or did CS1 itself 
assemble the mechanisms that made CS2 possible? If the latter is the case, then the 
mechanisms that enable cumulative culture were products of culture-culture co-evolution. 
Cumulative culture was, in this specific sense, “self-assembling”. 
 
A self-assembly hypothesis 
According to our self-assembly hypothesis, the role of genetic evolution, though important, 
was limited. Genetic evolution driven by increasing climatic variability and environmental 
change gave us larger brains[26], longer childhoods[27], and more powerful domain-general 
cognitive resources. Associative learning, working memory and inhibitory control were all 
dialled up, leading, eventually, to a distinctive capacity for slow, deliberative, explicit 
cognition that made heavy use of working memory [28-31]. These genetically-based 
upgrades to domain-general cognitive resources enabled early hominins to learn more 
efficiently the information they needed to hunt and gather in a changing and variable 
environment. But, on our hypothesis, these genetic changes were not responsible for shaping 
specialized cognitive mechanisms for accelerating cultural evolution. Cognitive mechanisms 
like imitation, mindreading and normative cognition emerged later via cultural evolutionary 
processes.  Relatively simple cognition got fast cultural evolution off the ground.  Learners 
were initially driven by attentional processes to copy better models and small improvements 
in technique; they did not make explicit comparisons between models or consciously 
recognize improvements. They had “competence without comprehension” [32].  
Our hypothesis emphasizes the importance of culture-culture co-evolution. We do not 
assume that specialized cognitive mechanisms such as imitation have been genetically 
assimilated to any substantial degree. This is because we think the present-day evidence from 
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developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience points towards these mechanisms 
being culturally inherited now (Supplement 3, [33]). To the extent that this is plausible, it is 
important to have viable evolutionary hypotheses that do not rely on genetic assimilation.  
Our hypothesis has a basic platform—a starting point shared with other great apes—
and five steps from that basic platform to fast, cumulative culture (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1.   The self-assembly hypothesis.  Culture-culture coevolution produces fast 
cumulative culture in five steps.  Cultural Selection 1 (CS1) initiates the co-evolutionary 
process.  First knowledge and skills (Step 1), then attentional social learning biases (Step 2), 
then explicit social learning biases (Step 3), are socially inherited from biological parents and 
spread through the population because their bearers tend to have more offspring.  
Subsequently, Cultural Selection 2 (CS2) also contributes.  Enhanced knowledge and skills 
(Step 4) and cognitive mechanisms (Step 5) are socially inherited from unrelated individuals 
and spread through the population because some models are more successful than others in 
competition for learners.  The five-step process not only produces fast cumulative culture, but 
is itself cumulative: each step augments, rather than replaces, the previous step (green arrow).  
The schematic figures on the right represent typical social interactions in each step.  See text 
for details. 
 
Step 0: The basic platform 
The human lineage, at the time of its divergence from the other great apes about six million 
years ago, would have possessed a significant capacity for social learning. Like a wide range 
of animal species alive today, our earliest human ancestors could learn by observing the 
behaviour of other agents that some places and objects are worth exploring (stimulus 
enhancement[34, 35]), while others are either dangerous or rewarding (observational 
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conditioning[36, 37]). They could also learn socially what the outcomes of actions are likely 
to be (observational learning[38, 39]): prodding a hive releases bees, and digging in certain 
areas reveals tubers [40, 41].   
These social learning capacities were once thought to depend on specialised cognitive 
processes, but recent evidence indicates that they are based on the same associative 
mechanisms as those involved in asocial learning [38, 42-47]. These mechanisms are 
powerful but, in the form present among our earliest ancestors, they do not allow high fidelity 
copying of fine bodily movement and technique. 
Early hominins would also have possessed structural and attentional social learning 
biases. A structural bias is a tendency to learn from some models rather than others due to 
social structure and geography [48-50]. Juveniles would have learned most from their 
mothers, and to a lesser extent from other members of their immediate residential group, 
simply because they spent more time in close proximity to these agents than to others. An 
attentional bias is a tendency to learn from some models rather than others because they are 
particularly attention-grabbing [30, 51]. These attention-grabbing actors or actions might be 
intrinsically salient (large, noisy, pungent)[52], close to salient rewards (e.g. close to food 
[53, 54]) or previously associated with reward (e.g. their actions tend to produce or release 
food[55]).  
Structural and attentional biases, like the social learning they modulate, are based on 
evolutionarily ancient, domain-general cognitive mechanisms [56, 57]. The social learning 
biases found in fish, birds and small mammals[48, 58] can be explained by attentional 
processes that bias social learning in the same way as asocial learning, and that evolved long 
before hominins appeared on the scene [57]. Nonetheless, we should not underestimate the 
power of attentional biases. They can produce patterns which, at the population level, fit the 
description of what cultural evolution theorists call conformist bias, prestige bias and payoff 
bias [16, 59, 60]. For example, suppose a child learns to associate a particular adult’s 
behaviour with subsequent food rewards and, as a result, attends preferentially to that adult’s 
behaviour. They will end up displaying a simple form of payoff-biased learning without 
needing to make any explicit judgements about whose behaviour leads to payoffs [55]. 
 
Step 1: Cultural Selection 1 of knowledge and skills  
A capacity for social learning, and for simple learning biases, can be found in a wide range of 
species, and is clearly not sufficient for fast, cumulative culture. What made hominins 
different?  
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For early hominins, learned knowledge and skills were crucial for survival, and, with 
the extension of childhood, juveniles had more opportunity to acquire them vertically, 
primarily from their mothers [61].  Consequently, socially learned knowledge and skills 
began to spread through populations for the simple reason that their bearers tended to have 
greater reproductive fitness.  Individuals who learned, for example, a more effective foraging 
technique from their mothers had better nutrition and more viable offspring, and passed the 
technique on to each of those descendants.  CS1 of knowledge and skills became increasingly 
powerful and important.   
This does not mean that CS1 is uniquely human. In fact, CS1 appears to be occurring 
now among bottlenose dolphins.  Some wild dolphins in Shark Bay, Western Australia, use 
marine sponges, worn on their closed rostrum (beak), to probe the sea floor for food[62]. 
There is evidence that this foraging technique is transmitted vertically through social learning 
from mothers to their female offspring[12], and that mothers who forage in this way have 
more offspring than mothers who do not [63]. If it is confirmed that the technique is 
spreading by selection on cultural variation, these dolphins could be an excellent model 
system for studying the very earliest stages of hominin cultural evolution. 
 
Step 2: Cultural Selection 1 of attentional learning biases  
CS1 can be cumulative, but the accumulation will be slow (Supplement 2). Since it relies on 
differential biological reproduction, CS1 occurs on broadly the same timescale as genetic 
evolution (although the supply of variation may differ: new cultural innovations may appear 
more or less frequently than genetic mutations). What it provides is a process that can drive 
the evolution of new cognitive mechanisms that accelerate cultural evolution.  In the first 
accelerating innovation, learned attentional biases—cognitive rather than physical skills—
became subject to CS1.   
CS1 acting on knowledge and physical skills (Step 1) produced an increasing number 
of valuable, socially-learnable traits in human populations: knowledge and skills that it would 
be advantageous for juveniles to learn from models other than one’s own parents.  Ancient 
attentional biases (Step 0) were available to guide juveniles when they were learning from 
unrelated adults and peers (oblique transmission and horizontal transmission), but their 
choice of models became yet more adaptive when they began to socially learn attentional 
biases from their parents.  For example, they no longer had to learn for themselves, by trial-
and-error, that it is beneficial to attend more to females for foraging skills and males for 
hunting skills (if indeed it was), or to go to elders rather than peers for rare ecological 
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information. Instead, they could learn these biases by tracking the social attention of their 
parents in different task contexts. 
There is evidence that contemporary humans can socially learn attentional biases.  
Specifically, we can learn to attend more to some agents than others by following the gaze of 
third parties [64, 65]. For example, when given choices of foods to consume and objects to 
manipulate, 3- and 4-year-old children are more likely to learn from an adult to whom they 
have seen other adults attending than from an adult who was ignored [64]. Nonhuman 
primates have attentional biases that influence their choice of models[66, 67] but, as far as we 
are aware, no one has asked whether nonhuman animals can socially learn attentional biases.  
For example, there is evidence that vervet monkeys attend more to female than male models 
when learning how to open a box to obtain food[66] but the origin of this attentional bias is 
not known.  Does each vervet learn through its own efforts that the behaviour of females is 
more likely than the behaviour of males to have a desirable outcome, or can young vervets 
learn to attend more closely to females by watching the watching behaviour of adults?  
The existing evidence leaves a great deal of uncertainty as to when the ability to 
socially learn attentional biases first evolved. We conjecture that it was in place in Homo 
erectus well before 700,000 years ago, when the next steps in our account begin. It may have 
evolved much earlier. Although we suspect that socially learned attentional biases have been 
far more important for hominins than for other species, we do not rule out the possibility that 
some other animals do learn attentional biases from their parents, and that these learned 
attentional biases have been shaped by CS1.  
Research on “shared attention” and “joint attention” in contemporary children often 
assumes that these phenomena require understanding of others’ psychological states [68].  In 
contrast, step 2 in our self-assembly model does not require mindreading.  For social learning 
of attentional bias, learners need to track models looking behaviour, not their mental states.  
In so far as attentional biases are transmitted from parents to offspring, they can be 
targets of CS1. Parents with valuable attentional biases will have greater reproductive 
success, and the biases will spread.  
 
Step 3: Cultural Selection 1 of explicit learning biases 
We come now to the steps that we propose to be unique to the hominin lineage. As noted 
above, we agree with the received wisdom that human cognitive evolution involved 
genetically-based upgrades to domain-general cognitive resources, leading to a capacity for 
slow, deliberative, explicit cognition that made heavy use of working memory. The basic 
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logic of our self-assembly hypothesis does not depend on any specific assumptions regarding 
when this happened. We suspect, however, that Late Acheulean lithic technology is a sign 
that a form of explicit cognition was in place by around 700,000 years ago, the time of Homo 
heidelbergensis. Neuroimaging studies suggest that, in modern humans, success in Late 
Acheulean toolmaking techniques relies on working memory [69-72]. We cannot be sure that 
H. heidelbergensis would have learned and executed Acheulean toolmaking skills in the same 
way we do, but it is a reasonable conjecture.  
Once explicit cognition is present, it enables a new type of learning bias on which CS1 
can get to work—explicit learning biases. Explicit learning biases are internally represented 
rules of thumb. They may include highly specific rules such as: “find individual X, Y or Z to 
observe the manufacture of cleavers, and individual A, B or C to observe the manufacture of 
handaxes.” Some rules may refer learners to specific models (“X, Y or Z”), while others may 
refer learners to a general type of model (such as “learn flint knapping from the person who 
makes the most symmetric shapes”). Explicit learning biases require a capacity for 
conceptual representation (e.g. possession of concepts referring to specific types of person, 
tool, and shapes), but it is not clear that they require language. Language could have come 
along later.  
Attentional biases, of the kind that were important in Steps 1 and 2, are limited in their 
specificity and accuracy. They lead learners to better than average models from the pool of 
nearby options, but they will struggle to lead learners to the best models in a sizeable social 
group. By relating cranial volume to social network size, Gamble, Gowlett and Dunbar 
estimate that H. heidelbergensis lived in social networks of 100-150 recognized individuals 
[73, 74]. A more recent estimate, incorporating archaeological data alongside cranial volume, 
revised this downwards to 60-120 [75]. But even a group size of 60 is enough to create a 
problem. As group size grows, it becomes increasingly difficult for a juvenile to learn who 
the best experts are at specific skills purely by tracking the gaze of their parents. Juveniles 
might learn to attend to elders when uncertain about an important ecological fact, but they 
will not reliably find their way to the most knowledgeable elder. The problem is that they are 
not making explicit judgements about who should, and who should not, be copied in 
particular domains. It is simply that their attention is reliably drawn to some models rather 
than others by relatively low-level, domain-general psychological processes. Because 
learners are not reliably able to find the most technically accomplished models in large 
groups, in Steps 1 and 2 we do not yet have conditions in which small improvements to an 
established technique can spread reliably and rapidly. 
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In Step 3, explicit learning biases allow juveniles to reliably access the best models 
available, and to dedicate their learning efforts to those specific models. A learner who can 
reliably find the most technically accomplished models will gain biological fitness benefits 
from doing so, as long as their superior technique can be learned. This provides a selection 
pressure in favour of explicit learning biases, since they can overcome the limitations of 
attentional learning biases.  
Although genetic changes of some kind will have been involved in the origin of explicit 
cognition, there is no reason to think that any further genetic changes are required for explicit 
learning biases, once explicit cognition in general exists. Explicit cognition brings with it a 
versatile capacity to represent rules. Rules about learning (such as copy the majority) can be 
learned, just like straightforwardly technical rules (such as strike flint against pyrite to make 
a spark). If the learning rules are passed down the generations from parents to offspring, CS1 
will be able to shape them, gradually making them increasingly adaptive. We envisage this 
refinement of explicit learning biases through CS1 as a gradual process taking place over 
hundreds of thousands of years, beginning around 700,000 years ago.  
There is evidence that explicit social learning biases—judgements about who to copy 
—are crucial to fast cultural accumulation [51, 76, 77]. They are used, in addition to 
attentional learning biases, by adult humans alive today[78-80], but as yet there is no 
evidence that they are used by children younger than 4 or 5-years-old[81] or by nonhuman 
animals.[57] 
 
Step 4: Cultural Selection 2 of knowledge and skills 
With accurate, specific, explicit learning biases, assembled by CS1, comes the possibility of 
fast, cumulative cultural evolution of knowledge and skills. An explicit rule can be highly 
task-specific: it can pertain to the manufacture of a particular tool, for example, and may 
identify a correlate of success that is very specific to that task, such as the symmetry of the 
end-product. This task-specificity means high quality models can be reliably identified, 
leading to greater exclusivity. A learner equipped with a model selection strategy that reliably 
picks out high quality models for particular task-specific skills has more to gain from 
investing effort in copying the specific technique of a specific individual, rather than hedging 
their bets and learning from as many different models as possible [51, 82].  
High fidelity copying of small improvements is the type of copying that allows fast 
accumulation. Because learners are very discriminating—they choose only the best models in 
the relevant task domain, and learn exclusively or nearly exclusively from them—small 
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improvements in technique can spread reliably and rapidly without being explicitly 
recognised by the learner as improvements. They spread because they make a substantial 
difference to the cultural fitness of their bearers: their success in attracting learners who are 
selecting their models using explicit learning biases. If a small improvement to an existing 
technique promotes the correlate of success tracked by the learning bias (e.g. the symmetry of 
the end-product), learners will gravitate towards the innovator. Small improvements to 
existing techniques will be retained in the population and will spread widely, creating many 
new sites for new small improvements, which will in turn be retained and copied.  
This is a process with a Darwinian character, but one in which change is driven not by 
differences in reproductive success but by differences between models in the number of 
learners they attract. This is Cultural Selection 2 (CS2): cultural change driven by culturally 
inherited differences in cultural fitness. CS2 is the engine of fast, cumulative cultural change. 
We do not think there was a single, special moment when CS2 “took off”, and we do not 
think that explicit learning biases were the only crucial ingredient. Life history mattered: as 
juvenile development lengthened, juveniles were able to invest more and more time in 
learning knowledge and skills, increasing the opportunities for CS2. Demography also 
mattered: in large, richly interconnected populations, there were more heads in which 
innovation could occur, more heads in which small improvements could be retained, and 
more to gain from seeking out the best models for particular skills [83]. We envisage CS2 
becoming gradually more important over time, as explicit learning biases become 
increasingly task-specific and exclusive, as the juvenile period of human life history becomes 
increasingly long, and as populations become larger and more richly interconnected. 
Levallois prepared core techniques may be an archaeological signature of cumulative CS2 
[19]. 
 
Step 5: Cultural Selection 2 of cognitive mechanisms 
CS2 is not limited to selection of small improvements to knowledge and skills. Small 
improvements to cognitive mechanisms that accelerate cultural accumulation, including 
imitation, mindreading and metacognition, can also increase in frequency.  
How might this work? The idea is that the cognitive mechanisms of cultural learning 
are themselves learned skills, or “cognitive gadgets” (Supplement 3[30]), and learners are 
selective in who they learn these skills from. Let us focus on the case of imitation—copying 
the topography of body movements. Imitation involves learning associations between how 
movements feel from the inside and how they look from the outside, solving the 
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correspondence problem. An adult can help a child to develop imitation in various ways: by 
copying their own movements (i.e. by imitating them) in their sight, by giving them 
opportunities to practice copying bodily movements with appropriate feedback, and by 
seeding the child’s environment with reflective surfaces that allow the child to see what they 
are doing [84].  
In contrast to some other skills, a child will not learn imitation from a single model. 
More plausibly, the child will learn it gradually from a wide range of adults and peers in their 
residential group. Because of this, we think a process of model selection operating at the 
group level may have been particularly important. Provided migration between residential 
groups is possible (and, in contemporary hunter-gatherers, it is common) the migrating parent 
can choose the group in which they live, and can therefore choose the child’s set of models. 
The parent will choose using learned explicit rules, such as move where people look 
healthiest, which they can put into practice at large seasonal aggregations of many residential 
groups [85]. The parent’s choice will be influenced by, among other factors, the imitative 
abilities of the group, in so far as groups with better imitative abilities will be more 
cooperative and have better ecological knowledge and skills. Groups with better imitative 
abilities will attract more migrants, and therefore more learners. This is a form of CS2, since 
it relies on model selection, but the model selection involves evaluations of whole groups 
rather than individuals. Moreover, since imitation is transmitted in part through models 
imitating learners, we predict that models who are better imitators will also be better at 
transmitting their superior imitative abilities to those who spend time around them—a 
positive feedback loop. 
In short, groups whose members have better cognitive mechanisms for high-fidelity, 
selective copying will attract more migrants and grow in size at the expense of others. As 
groups get larger, there are more and more heads in which a new, small innovation might 
occur. This has the potential to further accelerate the CS2 of knowledge and skills at the level 
of individuals within those groups, making the group as a whole yet more attractive to new 
migrants—another positive feedback loop. 
 
Conclusion 
The self-assembly hypothesis offers three new answers to the question: Why is cumulative 
culture uniquely human?  They are not mutually exclusive, and each answer is empirically 
testable. 
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First, it is possible that CS1 of knowledge and skills (Step 1) has rarely evolved 
because few species have had a social structure that gives juveniles the opportunity to learn a 
lot from their parents with high fidelity [48, 86]. This would be supported by evidence—
perhaps modelled on recent work with dolphins[2, 4, 12, 63]—showing that CS1 of 
knowledge and skills is more common in species where juveniles spend most of their time 
with biological relatives of the previous generation.    
Second, it may be difficult to transition from CS1 of knowledge and skills to CS1 of 
attentional biases (Step 2) because variants required to track parental attention are rarely 
available.  In humans, attention tracking is enhanced by inborn tendencies to orient to 
faces[87] and voices[88] and possibly by reduced scleral colouration [89]. A priority for 
future research is to find out which extant species are capable of socially learning 
attentionally biases (for example, to learn copy females by observing the orienting behaviour 
of third parties[66]), and whether, in human and nonhuman populations, such biases can be 
vertically inherited in a way that enhances biological fitness. 
Third, there may be a roadblock at the emergence of explicit social learning biases 
(Step 3).  These require explicit cognition of a kind that may or may not be dependent on 
language [51].  To find out, we need research with nonhuman animals that does not merely 
document social learning biases, but is designed to distinguish biases mediated by implicit 
(attentional) from explicit cognition.[57]  
The self-assembly hypothesis suggests that fast, cumulative culture emerged slowly by 
means of CS1.  In this respect, it is consistent with archaeological evidence that the stone 
tools used by early hominins (Oldowan and Acheulean) were not dependent on fast, 
cumulative culture [70, 90, 91]. 
The search for animal culture[9, 11] has been dominated by the idea that patterns of 
geographical variation in socially learned behaviour, and in particular the diffusion of 
qualitative novelty, are the most important things to investigate [3, 7, 8, 46]. There has been 
interesting developmental work on opportunities for social learning in free-living primates, 
e.g. [92, 93], but relatively little attention has been given to vertical cultural inheritance: How 
much do offspring learn from their parents? Are small improvements retained or not? The 
self-assembly hypothesis suggests that these questions matter, because the roots of fast 
cumulative culture are more likely to be found in species that, due to their social structure, 
have significant potential for high-fidelity vertical cultural inheritance under free-living 
conditions. This would be evident in family-specific behaviours: techniques passed down the 
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generations of a family group and varying between families, with small improvements being 
retained. 
We have argued that the self-assembly hypothesis is coherent, plausible, and 
empirically testable.  It contrasts with a standard gene-culture co-evolution story by giving a 
central role to culture-culture co-evolution, with a fairly circumscribed role for genetic 
change. This type of account is favoured by evidence that cultural learning is culturally 
inherited today (Supplement 3), and can be tested further through empirical research on the 
behaviour of human and nonhuman animals.  
Let us now return to the questions we started with. What makes fast, cumulative 
cultural evolution work? Our answer is CS2: models varying in the number of learners they 
attract, with small, unobvious improvements being copied faithfully and more often, allowing 
those improvements to spread rapidly through populations. Where did it come from? We 
suggest that CS2 came from CS1: a simpler, slower process in which knowledge and skills, 
then attentional biases, then explicit biases were inherited by juveniles predominantly from 
their biological parents. Why is cumulative cultural evolution the sole preserve of humans? 
Because there are several points along the path from a platform of basic social learning 
capacities to CS2 where the conditions have to be just right.  Other species, throughout the 
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Table 1. Glossary 
 
Attentional bias  
 
A social learning bias mediated by domain-general attentional processes  
Asocial learning Learning without the assistance of other agents. Also known as “individual 
learning” 
Cognitive gadget A domain-specific cognitive process shaped by cultural evolution 
Conformist bias A social learning bias in favour of variants that are currently prevalent among 
available models 
Cultural evolution Change in the frequencies of cultural variants over time 
Cultural fitness The number of learners an individual model succeeds in attracting, weighted 
by the model’s degree of influence over the learner 
Cultural inheritance The transmission down the generations of cultural variants, leading to 
persisting cultural differences between populations 
Cultural learning Social learning mediated by cognitive mechanisms that are specialized for 
promoting cultural inheritance 
Cultural Selection 1 (CS1) A Darwinian process in which cultural variants spread because they cause 
their bearers to have more biological offspring, and because offspring learn 
from their parents  
Cultural Selection 2 (CS2) A Darwinian process in which cultural variants spread because they cause 
their bearers to attract more learners, giving them higher cultural fitness  
Cultural variant Anything that can be learned socially (e.g. psychological processes, artefacts, 
skills, habits, customs, rituals, ideas, beliefs, values) 
Cumulative cultural evolution Cultural evolution in which small improvements to existing cultural variants 
spread through populations, gradually leading to complex adaptive products 
that no single individual could have designed from scratch 
Domain-general cognitive 
mechanism 
A cognitive mechanism that works in the same way across a broad range of 
tasks and contexts, e.g. social and non-social 
Domain-specific cognitive 
mechanism 
A cognitive mechanism that works in one task or context and less efficiently 
or not at all in others, e.g. social or non-social 
Explicit bias A social learning bias mediated by a domain-specific psychological rule such 
as copy the majority 
Genetic assimilation A process whereby environmentally induced phenotypic variation acquires a 
genetic basis 
Genetic evolution Change in the frequencies of genes over time 
High-fidelity transmission The learning of a cultural variant with sufficiently few errors that even small, 
unobvious improvements will be retained 
Horizontal transmission The learning of a cultural variant by a member of one generation from 
another member of the same generation 
Oblique transmission The learning of a cultural variant by a member of a younger generation from 
a member of an older generation who is not a biological parent 
Payoff bias A social learning bias in favour of learning cultural variants that effectively 
yield rewards 
Prestige bias A social learning bias in favour of learning from models who are already 
successful in attracting learners and have markers of that success 
Social learning Learning assisted by observation of, or interaction with, other agents 
Social learning bias Any mechanism that biases an individual’s social learning away from one 
cultural variant and towards another.  Also known as “social learning 
strategy”, “learning bias”, and “transmission bias” 




Supplement 1 - Cultural evolution and population thinking 
 
Cultural evolution research is currently in a period of rapid development, and various 
different schools of thought co-exist in the field.1-8  
Most cultural evolutionists agree on the importance of “population thinking”: cultural 
change can be understood by looking at the dynamics of social learning processes acting on 
populations. But many population thinkers downplay the importance of Darwinian selection 
processes.9,10 For example, Sperber and colleagues11,12 have developed a non-Darwinian 
framework based on the concept of a “cultural attractor”. These non-Darwinian approaches 
are not our focus here. 
Defenders of Darwinian (or “selectionist”) approaches, pioneered by Donald 
Campbell13,14 in the 1960s and 1970s, hold that Darwinian processes have a special role. 
They argue that, just as in the case of genetic evolution, there are many causes of cultural 
change, but only a Darwinian process of “blind variation and selective retention”13 is able to 
generate complex, well-adapted cultural products without the need for intelligent 
design.15,16,17,18  
Darwinian approaches can themselves be divided into meme-centred and individual-
centred approaches.19,20 The meme-centred approach regards the cultural inheritance as 
particulate, like genetic inheritance, and models the flow of these particles through 
populations.6,21 The individual-centred approach does not assume that cultural inheritance is 
particulate. It focusses on learners and the people from whom they learn (“models”), looking 
in a more holistic way at the inheritance channel between a model and a learner. Sometimes 
models that succeed in attracting larger numbers of learners are said to have higher cultural 
fitness (Supplement 2). 
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Supplement 2 - Cumulative and non-cumulative Darwinian processes 
 
A cumulative Darwinian process is one in which very small improvements gradually 
accumulate. Each small improvement spreads through the population, creating many new 
sites at which a further small improvement may arise by chance. This next improvement will 
then itself spread, creating new sites for yet another small improvement, and so on. The result 
is that complex, adaptive, apparently “well designed” products are gradually assembled 
without the need for any intelligent design.1-5  
 
Both types of cultural selection can be cumulative but will not always be cumulative. Special 
further conditions are required to turn a selection process into a cumulative one.6 In 
particular, the transmission of traits must occur with high fidelity, so that tiny improvements 
(so small as to be unobvious to their inventors) that arise by chance will be inherited rather 
than disappearing. It is also crucial that tiny improvements reliably make a difference to 
fitness, so that selection can “see” them. 
 
We hypothesize that, at an early stage in hominin evolution, cultural transmission from 
parents to their offspring (vertical transmission) already met the conditions for accumulation: 
fidelity was high owing to the sheer amount of time offspring spent with their parents, and 
small differences in cultural variants made a difference to a parent’s reproductive success. 
The result was cumulative CS1. We think cumulative CS1 may even occur in some non-
human animals, such as dolphins and chimpanzees. 
 
By contrast, in common with many researchers who study traditions in nonhuman animals13, 
we hypothesize that cumulative CS2—the faster, distinctively human type—only came along 
much later. On our hypothesis, it required exclusive, task-specific copying of models, 
achieved through explicit learning rules. Only then would tiny improvements to existing 
techniques have been reliably transmitted to learners, and only then would these tiny 
improvements have reliably made a difference to a model’s ability to attract new learners. 
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Supplement 3 - Cognitive gadgets 
 
Cultural learning, the kind of learning that makes cultural evolution possible now, involves 
imitation, mindreading and language.  Since the 1970s and 1980s, it has been assumed that 
each of these capabilities is a “cognitive instinct”1 designed by genetic evolution in the 
Pleistocene era, inherited in the DNA of each human child, and requiring minimal learning 
for its development.  However, recent evidence from developmental psychology and social 
cognitive neuroscience challenges this assumption by suggesting that, like literacy, the 
capacities to copy new body movements, to interpret the minds of others, and to 
communicate using language are all constructed by learning in the context of social 
interaction.  Rather than cognitive instincts, they are “cognitive gadgets”.2 
Imitation was thought to be a cognitive instinct because influential research in the 
1970s suggested that newborn human babies can copy facial expressions.3  This result was 
recently undermined by a large-scale study that failed to find any sign of imitation in 
newborns.4,5  Furthermore, evidence has emerged that the capacity to imitate develops slowly 
in the course of childhood6,7 and depends on social experience in which juveniles are exposed 
to synchronous action, optical mirrors, and imitation by other agents.8-10  
Mindreading was taken to be a cognitive instinct because it depends on specialised 
computations and localised areas of the brain, and because people with autism find it 
particularly difficult to interpret thoughts and feelings. However, these inferences have been 
weakened by evidence that literacy, a capacity known to be culturally rather than genetically 
inherited, is also characterised by computational and neural specialisation, and associated 
with a distinctive developmental disorder (dyslexia).11  Moreover, positive evidence that 
mindreading is a cognitive gadget has come from research showing that the rate, sequence 
and extent of mindreading development depends on how much and in what ways children 
converse with adults about mental states.12-15 
 The status of language is not so clear.  Many linguists and language scientists remain 
convinced by Chomsky’s “poverty of the stimulus argument”; that language has grammatical 
features that could not be learned from the environments in which language develops.16 
However, this view is being challenging with increasing vigour by research showing that 
FOXP2 is not a “language gene”17; “specific language impairment” is not, in fact, specific to 
language18; computers can learn complex grammatical structures without inbuilt linguistic 
knowledge19,20; and, in their everyday lives, children receive much more language tuition 
than earlier studies suggested.19   
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